contextual bandit problem
Fairness in Learning: Classic and Contextual Bandits
Matthew Joseph, Michael Kearns, Jamie H. Morgenstern, Aaron Roth
We introduce the study of fairness in multi-armed bandit problems. Our fairness definition demands that, given a pool of applicants, a worse applicant is never favored over a better one, despite a learning algorithm's uncertainty over the true payoffs. In the classic stochastic bandits problem we provide a provably fair algorithm based on "chained" confidence intervals, and prove a cumulative regret bound with a cubic dependence on the number of arms. We further show that any fair algorithm must have such a dependence, providing a strong separation between fair and unfair learning that extends to the general contextual case. In the general contextual case, we prove a tight connection between fairness and the KWIK (Knows What It Knows) learning model: a KWIK algorithm for a class of functions can be transformed into a provably fair contextual bandit algorithm and vice versa. This tight connection allows us to provide a provably fair algorithm for the linear contextual bandit problem with a polynomial dependence on the dimension, and to show (for a different class of functions) a worst-case exponential gap in regret between fair and non-fair learning algorithms.
Online Learning with an Unknown Fairness Metric
Stephen Gillen, Christopher Jung, Michael Kearns, Aaron Roth
We consider the problem of online learning in the linear contextual bandits setting, but in which there are also strong individual fairness constraints governed by an unknown similarity metric. These constraints demand that we select similar actions or individuals with approximately equal probability [?], which may be at odds with optimizing reward, thus modeling settings where profit and social policy are in tension. We assume we learn about an unknown Mahalanobis similarity metric from only weak feedback that identifies fairness violations, but does not quantify their extent. This is intended to represent the interventions of a regulator who "knows unfairness when he sees it" but nevertheless cannot enunciate a quantitative fairness metric over individuals. Our main result is an algorithm in the adversarial context setting that has a number of fairness violations that depends only logarithmically on T, while obtaining an optimal O( T) regret bound to the best fair policy.